PROPELOO

MPC WALLET DEVELOPMENT

Build MPC wallet infrastructure where no single key exists — and no single point of compromise can drain the vault.

PROPELOO engineers Multi-Party Computation wallet systems — threshold signature schemes (TSS), distributed key generation (DKG), institutional custody workflows, signing quorum management, key refresh protocols, and the operational infrastructure that makes MPC wallets viable for exchanges, asset managers and enterprises managing significant digital asset holdings.

Traditional hardware wallets store the full private key in a single secure element. MPC eliminates the concept of a single key — and with it, the single point of compromise.

Multi-Party Computation for digital asset custody addresses the fundamental weakness of traditional wallet security: a single private key that, if compromised, results in total loss of the funds it controls. In an MPC wallet, the private key never exists as a complete entity on any single device. Instead, key material is distributed across multiple parties using cryptographic protocols (ECDSA threshold signatures) that allow signing without any party ever reconstructing the full key. An attacker who compromises one party has nothing — they need to compromise the signing threshold simultaneously. For institutions managing digital assets worth millions, this is the difference between a security breach and a catastrophic loss event. PROPELOO builds MPC wallet infrastructure for exchanges requiring institutional-grade custody, asset managers building digital asset products, and enterprises with treasury management requirements that demand defence-in-depth key security.

What a production MPC wallet system contains.

Distributed key generation, threshold signing, and institutional workflow are three distinct engineering systems.

System Layers

  • MPC Protocol Layer: Distributed key generation (DKG), threshold ECDSA signing (GG20/CGGMP21), key refresh, proactive security
  • Party Management Layer: Signing party provisioning, party authentication, party failure detection, quorum management
  • Transaction Workflow Layer: Transaction construction, signing request initiation, quorum approval collection, broadcast
  • Custody Policy Layer: Spending limits, time delays for large transactions, dual approval workflows, emergency procedures
  • Key Management Layer: Key backup, key refresh schedule, party rotation, disaster recovery procedures

Core Technical Capabilities

  • Distributed Key Generation

    DKG protocol: N parties each contribute randomness, cooperatively generate key shares such that no party sees any other party share. The resulting key can sign ECDSA transactions with T-of-N party cooperation without ever reconstructing the full key.

  • Threshold Signature Scheme

    GG20 or CGGMP21 TSS protocol for ECDSA signatures. M-of-N parties cooperate to produce a valid ECDSA signature. Protocol is communication-round efficient — modern implementations complete in 2-3 rounds. Output is a standard ECDSA signature, compatible with any chain without modification.

  • Institutional Signing Workflow

    Transaction request creation, reviewer approval queue, approver notification, signing quorum assembly, transaction broadcast. Dual-control for large transactions. Time-lock for withdrawals above threshold. Audit log of every signing event.

  • Custody Policy Engine

    Per-wallet and per-transaction spending limits. Time-based restrictions (no withdrawals during off-hours without override). Whitelist-only destinations. Override approval workflow for exceptions. Policy changes require governance approval.

  • Key Refresh

    Proactive security key refresh: periodically re-randomise key shares without changing the public key or the funds it controls. Old shares become invalid after refresh. A share compromised before refresh has no value after. Recommended schedule: every 30-90 days.

  • Multi-Chain MPC Signing

    Single MPC key infrastructure for multiple chains: Ethereum, Bitcoin, Solana, TRON, and others. Chain-specific transaction construction with MPC signing layer providing the signature.

How we approach MPC wallet architecture.

MPC wallet security is defined by the weakest link in the signing party infrastructure. Every party must be as hardened as the most sensitive party.

  • Party infrastructure homogeneity reduces attack surface

    If some signing parties use HSMs and others use software keys, the effective security is that of the weakest party. All signing parties should use equivalent hardware security (HSM or secure enclave). Geographic distribution reduces the risk of simultaneous physical compromise, but hardware equivalence ensures the cryptographic security model is consistent.

    Axiom: WEAKEST PARTY DEFINES SECURITY

  • Key refresh is the primary defence against long-term attacks

    An advanced persistent threat that compromises one party and waits for an opportunity to compromise others is the primary attack model for institutional custody targets. Proactive key refresh eliminates the value of stale shares — a share compromised 3 months ago is worthless after a refresh cycle.

    Axiom: REFRESH DEFEATS PATIENT ATTACKERS

  • Signing workflow must be auditable and non-repudiable

    For regulated institutions, every signing event must be attributable to an authorised human action. The signing workflow must record who initiated the transaction, who approved it, which parties signed, and when. This audit trail is not just an operational requirement — it is a regulatory requirement for custodians.

    Axiom: AUDIT TRAIL IS REGULATORY COMPLIANCE

Key decisions in MPC wallet architecture.

These choices define the security model, operational complexity and chain coverage.

  • Which MPC protocol: GG18, GG20, or CGGMP21?

    Impact: CGGMP21 for new builds — best performance and security proofs. GG20 if integrating with existing Fireblocks or similar infrastructure. GG18 only for legacy compatibility.

    • GG18 — earliest widely deployed TSS, proven in production, slower (more rounds)
    • GG20 — improved performance, widely adopted (Binance, Fireblocks use variants)
    • CGGMP21 — latest, most efficient, fewer rounds, strongest security proofs
  • Party distribution: 2-of-3 vs 3-of-5 vs custom?

    Impact: 2-of-3 for exchanges and operational wallets where signing latency matters. 3-of-5 for cold storage and treasury wallets where higher security justifies operational overhead.

    • 2-of-3 — minimum redundancy, one party can be offline, two-party compromise loses funds
    • 3-of-5 — higher redundancy, two parties can fail or be offline, three-party compromise required
    • Custom N-of-M — match the organisation security model
  • On-premise parties vs cloud parties vs hardware device parties?

    Impact: On-premise HSM for the highest-security parties in an institutional custody context. Cloud HSM for geographic distribution parties. Hardware devices for user-controlled parties in a hybrid user+institution MPC model.

    • On-premise HSM — highest security, highest operational cost, physical security required
    • Cloud HSM (AWS CloudHSM, Azure Dedicated HSM) — strong security, geographic flexibility, cloud dependency
    • Hardware device (Ledger, custom) — portable, good for user-controlled parties
    • Software key in secure enclave — acceptable for lower-value wallets, not for institutional custody
  • Build vs use Fireblocks/Curv/ZenGo?

    Impact: Fireblocks for fast time-to-market at the cost of vendor dependency and per-transaction pricing. Build custom when transaction volume makes Fireblocks economics unfavourable, or when regulatory requirements mandate infrastructure ownership.

    • Fireblocks — market-leading MPC platform, excellent tooling, high per-transaction cost at scale
    • Build custom — full control, significant engineering investment (6-12 months for production-ready)
    • Taurus Group / Curv (acquired by PayPal) — enterprise options

What PROPELOO builds.

  • Exchange Hot Wallet MPC

    MPC hot wallet for a crypto exchange — 2-of-3 signing, institutional workflow, withdrawal queue, spending limits.

  • Institutional Custody System

    Digital asset custody for an asset manager — 3-of-5 MPC, dual-control approvals, audit trail, regulatory reporting.

  • Enterprise Treasury Wallet

    Corporate digital asset treasury — multi-party approval, policy engine, integration with ERP/treasury systems.

  • User + Institution MPC

    Hybrid model where user device and institution each hold a share — user controls access, institution provides recovery.

  • Fireblocks Migration

    Migrate from Fireblocks to a custom MPC infrastructure — new key generation, parallel testing, zero-downtime migration.

The MPC wallet infrastructure stack.

Cryptographic protocols, secure hardware, and institutional workflow.

  • MPC Protocol

    Stack: CGGMP21 / GG20 TSS, Threshold ECDSA library, DKG protocol implementation, Key refresh protocol, Side-channel resistant implementation

  • Party Hardware

    Stack: AWS CloudHSM / Thales, On-premise HSM, Trusted Execution Environment, Hardware attestation, Secure communication (TLS + certificate pinning)

  • Workflow

    Stack: Transaction approval system, Quorum assembly coordination, Audit log (append-only), Spending policy engine, Alert & escalation system

  • Connectivity

    Stack: Multi-chain transaction construction, Broadcast infrastructure, Transaction monitoring, Balance reconciliation, Regulatory reporting

MPC wallet security: the protocol is the easy part. The operational security of the signing parties is where institutions fail.

An MPC system is only as secure as the weakest signing party infrastructure.

  • Party isolation

    Signing parties must not share infrastructure (same cloud account, same network segment, same physical location). Compromise of shared infrastructure can affect multiple parties simultaneously.

  • Communication security

    MPC signing requires communication between parties. All inter-party communication encrypted with TLS + certificate pinning. Party authentication via hardware-backed certificates.

  • Side-channel attacks

    TSS implementations are vulnerable to timing and power analysis side-channel attacks if not implemented carefully. Use audited, side-channel resistant cryptographic libraries.

  • Key refresh operational discipline

    Key refresh requires coordination of all parties. A party that misses a refresh cycle has an invalid share. Refresh scheduling, party availability management, and failed refresh handling must be operationally documented and practiced.

From security requirements to production MPC custody.

  1. 01. Security Architecture

    Party model, HSM selection, quorum design, policy engine requirements, audit trail design.

  2. 02. MPC Protocol Implementation

    DKG, threshold signing, key refresh — protocol selection and implementation or integration.

  3. 03. Party Infrastructure

    HSM provisioning, party communication, authentication, network isolation.

  4. 04. Custody Workflow

    Transaction approval system, spending policies, audit logging.

  5. 05. Multi-Chain Integration

    Transaction construction per chain, broadcast, monitoring.

  6. 06. Security Audit

    Cryptographic implementation audit, operational security review, penetration testing.

  7. 07. Operational Readiness

    Runbooks, key refresh procedures, incident response, disaster recovery test.

MPC wallet systems we have shipped to production.

Three MPC implementations handling institutional-grade custody.

  • 2-of-3 MPC custody system for crypto exchange with HSM key shares

    Challenge: Crypto exchange needed to upgrade from multi-sig to MPC custody — eliminating on-chain signature traces, enabling threshold signing without full key reconstruction, and satisfying insurance requirements for institutional-grade custody.

    Architecture: GG20 threshold signing: 3 key shares distributed across exchange HSM, customer device, and cold hardware. 2-of-3 required for any transaction. Key generation ceremony recorded, shares never combined. Transaction signing via distributed MPC rounds.

    Outcome: Insurance eligibility achieved, $85M AUM protected, zero key compromise, audit by Big Four security firm with no material findings.

  • Wallet-as-a-service platform using MPC for 200K end-user wallets

    Challenge: FinTech needed a WaaS platform where end users have non-custodial wallets (user holds one key share) but the operator can enable social recovery (operator + guardian reconstruct if user share lost).

    Architecture: 2-of-2 MPC at rest, 2-of-3 for recovery: user device holds share A, server holds share B. Recovery mode: user verifies identity, operator share B + guardian share C reconstruct new share A. No plain key ever exists on server.

    Outcome: 200K wallets provisioned, 97% recovery success rate, user-perceived latency <500ms for signing, no custodial regulatory classification.

  • MPC-based transaction signing layer for institutional DeFi vault

    Challenge: Institutional DeFi fund needed MPC signing for on-chain transactions — multiple fund managers must approve transactions, no single manager can drain the vault, signing must integrate with their existing approval workflow.

    Architecture: Policy engine defines approval rules (e.g., <$50K single approver, >$50K requires two fund managers). MPC signing rounds triggered after policy check. Signed transaction broadcast only on threshold met. Full audit log.

    Outcome: $120M DeFi AUM protected, 100% policy enforcement in 18 months of operation, 3 attempted unauthorised transactions blocked by policy engine.

Frequently Asked Questions

How is MPC different from multi-sig?

Multi-sig (e.g., Gnosis Safe 3-of-5) requires multiple parties to each sign independently using their full keys, and the blockchain enforces the quorum requirement. MPC uses a cryptographic protocol where parties cooperate to produce a single standard signature — no key ever exists in full, and the blockchain sees a normal single-signature transaction. MPC has better privacy (the threshold scheme is invisible on-chain) and works on all chains without smart contract support.

What is key refresh and why is it important?

Key refresh re-randomises the key shares without changing the public key or moving the funds. After a refresh, the old shares become cryptographically worthless — an attacker who stole an old share cannot use it after refresh. This defeats long-term compromise scenarios where an attacker waits to collect enough shares over time. We recommend key refresh every 30-90 days.

Can you help us migrate from Fireblocks to a custom MPC system?

Yes. Migration requires generating new key material (the Fireblocks keys cannot be extracted — that is by design), moving funds to the new wallets, and setting up the operational workflows. We run both systems in parallel during migration, starting with lower-value wallets before migrating the main treasury. The migration timeline is typically 8-12 weeks.

How many parties should we have in our MPC scheme?

Depends on your use case. Hot wallets: 2-of-3 (two company devices + one hardware backup) balances security and operational speed. Cold storage: 3-of-5 with geographic distribution (e.g., three offices, two secure facilities). For enterprises: match your existing financial controls — if your treasury policy requires dual authorisation, a 2-of-3 scheme maps to that model.

Which MPC threshold schemes do you implement?

We implement state-of-the-art threshold signature protocols including CMP (Canetti, Gennaro, Goldfeder, Makriyannis, Peled 2020) and FROST (Flexible Round-Optimized Schnorr Threshold) for Ed25519 and Secp256k1 curves. These provide active security against malicious adversaries, non-interactive key generation options, and minimal network round-trips.

How do you enable gasless transactions and account abstraction with MPC?

We combine MPC key generation with ERC-4337 smart accounts. The MPC key share acts as the signer for UserOperations, while an ERC-4337 Paymaster contract sponsors gas fees or accepts token payment (e.g., USDC). This gives users a seamless Web2-like experience without requiring native ETH or SOL for transaction fees.

What disaster recovery and social recovery options exist for end users?

We architect redundant key share backup hierarchies: one share stored locally in secure hardware storage (Keychain/Secure Enclave), one encrypted in cloud backup (iCloud/Google Drive), and one managed by a quorum of institutional recovery guardians or social contacts. Users can recover their wallet without seed phrases if their device is lost.

Can institutions enforce multi-tier approval policies before MPC signing executes?

Yes. We integrate policy engine layers that evaluate transaction rules prior to initiating the MPC signing protocol. Rules can enforce multi-level management approvals, whitelisted destination addresses, time-window transaction caps, and biometric authentication before key shares participate in signature computation.